This paper describes a group communication system called the timewheel group communication system that has been designed for a timed asynchronous distributed system model. The timewheel group communication system consists of three protocols: a clock synchronization, an atomic broadcast protocol, and a group membership protocol. All these protocols have been designed to be fail-aware in the sense that a process can detect at any point in time whether any of its properties is violated. Although these protocol have been designed to operate in an asynchronous distributed computing environment, they provide timeliness properties. The timewheel group communication system provides nine group communication semantics that a user can dynamically choose from while broadcasting an update. This system provides high throughput, fast delivery and stability times, uses a small number of messages per update broadcast, and distributes evenly the processing load among group members. The good overall performance is maintained in the absence of any failures and normal update arrival rates, in the presence of communication or process failures, and under very fast or very slow update arrival rates.
Introduction
With the ever increasing use of computers in everyday life, particularly in critical applications, the need for high performance, real-time, dependable distributed systems is increasing. Unfortunately, building such systems is complicated. One technique to construct a dependable service is to implement it by a team of replicated servers. The underlying idea is that the currently running team members, i.e, the current group of servers that implement the service, maintain a consistent replicated service state and, if one member fails, the others form a new group and continue to provide the service. A group communication service is a set of fault-tolerant protocols that enable replicated application processes to maintain a consistent replicated state despite random communication delays or failures.
Clock synchronization, atomic broadcast and group membership protocols are a part of a group communication service. Different researchers have found one or more of these protocols to be useful for maintaining a consistent replicated service state [48, 14] . A clock synchronization protocol keeps the local clocks of correct processes In addition to these four unique characteristics, the timewheel group communication system provides excellent overall performance that includes fast delivery and stability times, small number of message exchanges per update broadcast, even distribution of processing load among group members, and high throughput. This excellent overall performance is maintained in the absence of any failures and normal update arrival rates, in the presence of communication or process failures, and under very fast or very slow update arrival rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the timed asynchronous distributed system model for which the proposed group communication service has been designed. Section 3 explains the semantics provided by the timewheel group communication system and the performance metrics used to evaluate this system. Section 4 gives an informal overview of the three protocols that comprise the timewheel group communication system. Sections 5 and 6 give a detailed description of the timewheel atomic broadcast protocol and the timewheel group membership protocol respectively. Section 7 provides the implementation details of this system, and Section 8 provides a detailed performance evaluation. Section 9 describes two applications that we have constructed using the timewheel group communication service. Finally, Section 10 discusses some related issues and concludes the paper.
System Model
The timed asynchronous system model [18] is the foundation of the timewheel group communication system. In this section we give a brief overview of the model, discuss the properties of this model, and then compare this model with the timely computing base (TCB) [51] and the approach taken by Hermant and Le Lann [32] .
Assumptions
A timed asynchronous distributed system [18] consists of a finite set of processes linked by an asynchronous datagram service. A one-way time-out delay is defined for the datagram service. Although there is no guarantee that a message sent using this datagram service will be delivered within time units, it is likely to be delivered within . We say that a process receives a message in a timely manner, if the transmission delay of is not greater than . When the transmission delay of is greater than , we say that has suffered a performance failure, or is late. We assume that the messages can also suffer omission failures [14] in addition to performance failures. This implies that a message sent by a process may never arrive at the intended receiver. However, whenever a message is received by the intended receiver, it is received uncorrupted.
The process management service defines a maximum scheduling delay , meaning that a process is likely to react to any trigger event (such as a timer event) within time units. If a process takes more than time units to react to a trigger event, it suffers a performance failure. When 's reaction time is at most , we say that is timely. We assume that a process may suffer crash failures [14] in addition to performance failures. A process crashes by stopping to execute its program, e.g., a crashed process stops responding to any inputs. The model assumes that processes do not perform any incorrect state transitions.
Each process has access to a local hardware clock . The drift rate of a correct hardware clock is bounded by an a priori known constant . Hardware clocks are not synchronized: the deviation between two correct hardware clocks can be arbitrarily large. For most quartz clocks available in modern computers, the maximum hardware clock drift rate is of the order of " ! $ # to " ! & %
. We assume that hardware clocks have crash failure semantics and that each non-crashed process has a correct hardware clock, i.e., a crash of a hardware clock ' results in the crash of .
Coverage of System Model Assumptions
A system model consists of a set of assumptions. A violation of any system model assumption can potentially result in a system safety violation, which, in a safety critical system could put human lifes at risk. For example, synchronous system models typically define that messages are delivered within a known maximum amount of time, say, within ( . A message that is requesting to close the gates of a railway crossing and that is assumed to be delivered by a given deadline can cause a safety violation if the message is delayed.
Guaranteeing message delivery within a bounded time is extremely difficult to implement with a sufficient coverage, i.e., such that the probability that this assumptions is violated during an execution is negligible. For example, the exact delay of hardware and software is often not known (e.g., due to non-determinism introduced by parallelism) and can only be approximated by measurements. The timing of two chips of the same version might be slightly different due the use of different chip masks for different batches of chips. Also, operating systems have typically many run-time switches that might result in different performance characteristics. This makes it extremely difficult to guarantee the timely delivery of messages and also the timeliness of processes, i.e., to avoid that processes miss deadlines.
The timed model was carefully defined such that the probability that one of its assumptions is violated during run-time can be made negligible. The assumptions of the timed model can be seen as requirements that are implemented in software and hardware. Depending on the criticality of the applications, one can use different implementations of these requirements. For example, an important assumption of the timed model is that a process can use its hardware clock to measure time with a known maximum error. For safety critical applications this can be implemented using redundant hardware clocks [27] while for less critical applications the use of a non-redundant hardware timer might be sufficient.
Synchronous versus Asynchronous Systems
Even though the timed model uses hardware clocks and has a notion of performance failures, it is not a synchronous system model. Defining the difference between a synchronous and an asynchronous system model is not straightforward. Because one can often use a software layer running on one model to implement the requirements of another model, the difference between a synchronous and an asynchronous system should not be based on specific assumptions of the model (e.g., if the model has a notion of time). Instead, it should be based on the power of a model (i.e., what problems can be solved in the model).
In our view, the difference between a synchronous and an asynchronous system model is that in a synchronous system one can guarantee that actions are executed by a given deadline. In an asynchronous system one cannot guarantee that! More precisely, we call a system model a synchronous model if and only if (1) in any execution permitted by the model there is always at least one correct process, and (2) one can correctly implement the following task is eventually correct, i.e., if
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, where, T depends on the execution. We call a system model that is neither synchronous nor partially synchronous, an asynchronous model.
The timed model is asynchronous because it neither excludes complete system failures, i.e., it permits executions in which all processes are crashed, nor does it permit to implement task ) 0
. For the latter, consider that the timed model permits executions in which all messages are dropped by the network, e.g., due to physically damaged network links. In such an execution, processes cannot communicate with each other and hence, one cannot implement ) 0 correctly.
Circumventing Impossibility Results
It has been shown that one cannot solve consensus [30] nor group membership [10] in asynchronous systems. The reason for these impossibility results are due to liveness conditions used in the problem specifications: "eventually something good (e.g., installation of a new membership) has to be achieved". In the timed model, we circumvent these impossibility results by using conditional timeliness requirements of the form "if the system behaves well in a given time interval U of length V , then something good has to be achieved within U ". Since a protocol has only to achieve something good if the system behaves well (e.g., like a synchronous system) sufficiently long, one can actually solve a large set of practically relevant problems.
To permit the definition of when a system behaves well, the timed model has the notion of message and process performance failures. For example, in this paper we say that the system behaves well in a given interval 
U
. Furthermore, all messages that arrive from processes that are not in W are detectably late, i.e., the processes in W will drop these messages on reception since their transmission delays were too long. The idea of this definition is that while some processes are partitioned away from the majority, e.g., due to a network failure, the system must still make progress.
Fail-Awareness
Our approach to designing protocols for the timed model typically uses a step by step refinement of the problem specification (e.g., see the stepwise refinement of a group membership specification in [26] ). We first specify the protocol for a completely synchronous system (i.e., no crash, omission, or performance failures) and then step by step modify the specification such that it becomes implementable in a timed asynchronous system. To circumvent impossibility results while still ensuring the safety of the system, we introduced the notion of fail-awareness [29] .
Most applications require the enforcement of safety properties, i.e., properties that must always hold. For example, a safety property could state that "whenever a train is in the railway crossing, the gates of the crossing are down". Implementing such safety properties often requires that the underlying system be synchronous, e.g., because sensor data has to be communicated and processed in a timely fashion. However, adding a simple "indicator" to such a safety property makes the new property implementable in timed asynchronous systems. If the indicator is true, the property is guaranteed to hold. Whenever the underlying system behaves well sufficiently long, the indicator must be true.
The fail-aware property of the previous railway crossing example becomes: "if the indicator U is true, then whenever a train is in the railway crossing, the gates of the crossing are down". The intuition is that as long as the indicator is true, the safety property is guaranteed to be true. However, if the indicator becomes false, the safety property might be violated. In this case, the systems might have to be switched to a fail-safe state, e.g., by lowering the gates. This switching to a fail-safe state can be enforced by using an appropriate interface to the environment (see [29] ).
The implementation of an indicator of a property X can be seen as a "synchrony" detection protocol. The implementation of the indicator makes sure that the indicator is only true if the system behaves sufficiently well to ensure the validity of X . [29] describes mechanisms that can be used to implement such indicators.
Using fail-awareness does not only make sense for fail-safe but also for fail-operational systems. It can be used to make fail-operational systems robust against unexpected performance and omission failures. For example, consider a fly-by-wire system that shares some hardware and software components with some less critical applications. Due to a temporary overload of the network, the fly-by-wire system might not be able to enforce all its safety properties. A monitor system can detect this situation by monitoring the indicators of the fly-by-wire component. If any indicator switches to false, the monitor might need to switch the system to an emergency mode in which all non-critical applications are immediately stopped. This will reduce the load immediately and the fail-aware specification of the fly-by-wire component requires that the safety properties be valid again within a bounded time. This fail-aware design increases the robustness of a system since the application designer is forced to recover from failures which do not have to be addressed when using a synchronous system model instead.
Parameter Selection
The timed model has three parametersY : , , . Parameters and are used to define message and process performance failures. The actual values of these parameters must not affect the correctness of an application! Larger values will make a system "behave well" more often while smaller values will make the system "behave well" less often. Due to the use of conditional timeliness requirements and fail-aware safety properties we avoid that the correctness of an application depends upon the values of (see also [18] ). Multiple such constraints usually permit the derivation of appropriate bounds for and .
Alternatively, an application designer could define a "target" probability for performance failures, i.e., associate term "likely" (which we use in the model description) with a probability. Measurements of the transmission and scheduling delays in the target system together with the given target probability permits one to define and . However, we do not believe that the probability of failures should be part of the model: (1) to make applications more robust, we do want to avoid that the correctness of an applications depends on the probability of failures (e.g., we want to disallow simple protocols that "guarantee" certain communication by simply transmitting messages q r I H times), and (2) force an protocol to adapt to changing environments.
The correctness of fail-aware protocols typically depend on a correctly chosen value for the clock drift . The clock drift can typically be derived from the physical properties (or, the data sheet) of the used oscillators and the operating temperature range of the target system. Due to the reliance on the bounded drift rate of clocks, for critical applications one might use a fault-tolerant hardware clock design [27] .
Related Models
Time-Free Model (a.k.a. FLP Model)
The timed asynchronous distributed system model is significantly different from the well-known time-free asynchronous distributed system model [30] 
Timely Computing Base
The timely computing base (TCB) [51] splits a system into two parts: a synchronous control part and an asynchronous payload part. We agree with the authors that it is useful and sometimes even necessary to divide a system in asynchronous and synchronous parts. However, we suggest to partition the system in a different way [29] .
We propose to divide a critical system into fail-safe and fail-operational components [29] instead of dividing it into a control and a payload part. Each of these components might be further dividable into fail-operational and fail-safe components. One can continue this division until the system consists of atomic fail-operational and fail-safe components, i.e., it is not reasonable to divide these components any further.
We suggest to design both fail-operational and fail-safe components using the fail-aware design paradigm. The atomic fail-operational components should be executed in parts of the underlying computing systems that are made as synchronous as possible/needed. For example, one might use reserved processors and network links to execute the fail-operational components. We propose to use the fail-aware design paradigm also for the failoperational components because this permits to detect when the underlying system is not sufficiently synchronous and in turn, permits to reconfigure the system to reduce the occurrence of further performance and omission failures. Since components typically interact with each other, the indicators of a fail-aware service permits a client to detect that the service cannot guarantee its safety properties and in this way, a client can avoid state contaminations.
To increase the robustness of the system, we do not agree that the inclusion of assumptions Ps1 (timely processing) and Ps3 (timely message delivery) in the TCB is a good idea. While we agree that Ps1 and Ps2 are requirements that at least parts of the underlying system should attempt to implement (e.g., those parts on which fail-operational components are running), a protocol should not depend on these assumptions since this can decrease the robustness of the protocol and can be the cause of state contamination problems. The authors of [51] argue that Ps1 and Ps2 are needed to guarantee the semantics of fail-operational components. While this is superficially true, the real issue is how to handle the case if Ps1 and Ps2 are violated during run-time. The fail-awareness approach will also guarantee that all safety and timeliness properties hold as long as Ps1 and Ps2 are true. However, if Ps1 and Ps2 are violated during run-time, the system can detect this (using the indicators of the fail-aware services) and can then attempt to repair the problem (e.g., by shedding load). After a successful repair, the fail-aware services are forced to provide their properties again within a bounded time.
Adding services to a model is important to simplify the design and implementation of protocols. Instead of proposing a fixed set of services that are part of the TCB, we proposed different fail-aware services for the timed model that provide similar functionalities (e.g., [28] , [26] ). This permits a system designer a greater flexibility in selecting the right set of services for the problem at hand. Also, this paper describes group communication services that can be used to simplify the design of protocols for the timed model.
Synchronous Model
An alternative approach to design real-time applications is proposed by [32] . The authors propose to design protocols for a time-free model extended by a crash failure detector and then immerse this algorithm into a synchronous model during the implementation phase. The authors claim that during this immersion the timeliness properties of the protocol will emerge.
The approach proposed by [32] could be viewed as the inverse of our approach. They propose to use a weaker design model and then run the protocol in a synchronous system model. The hope is that since the protocol was designed for a time-free model, it can naturally cope with performance failures that might occur during run-time.
We proposed [26] to start by specifying the problem for a completely synchronous system and then step by step modify the specification of the protocol to adjust it for the reduced power of the implementation model.
We see the following disadvantages of the approach proposed by [32] in comparison to our approach:
System Safety: The validity of safety properties often depends on the validity of timeliness requirements (e.g., consider the above railway crossing example in which sensor information has to be received and processed in time to guarantee the safety of the system). Since timeliness requirements emerge during the immersion during the implementation phase [32] , it is not possible to design protocols such that they be able to detect the violation of timeliness requirements which is needed to detect the violation of safety properties.
Computational Disparity:
The set of problems solvable in a synchronous model (with timing failures) is different from the set of problems solvable in a time-free model extended by a crash failure detector.
Hence, some problems might be solvable in the implementation model that are not solvable in the design model and vice versa. The latter might be due to omission failures that are typically not considered in time-free models but have to be considered in an implementation model due to finite buffer space and link failures. This disparity is an important issue since (1) many problems (e.g., railway crossing example, all fail-aware problems) are not solvable in time-free models extended by a crash failure detector, and (2) problems proven to be correct in the design model might not be correct in the implementation model (e.g., due to omission failures).
Simplicity:
The design of protocols for time-free models is sometimes said to be simpler than that for synchronous or timed asynchronous models. While we see that time-free models are typically simpler, we believe that the design of protocols for a completely synchronous model is much simpler than for a time-free model. The reason for our claim is that the set of possible executions in a synchronous model is typically much smaller than that of a time-free model. In particular, if a process in a synchronous system is in a certain state, the set of states that the other processes can be in is typically very small in comparison to the possible states in an asynchronous model. This "state explosion problem" is due to the asynchronous nature of the model and hence, increases the difficulty in designing protocols for asynchronous models. We believe it is therefore simpler to start the design/specification for a completely synchronous model and then step by step refine the design/specification while weakening the system model. Our approach is a good match with evolutionary software processes (e.g., extreme programming) that are used in practice. One can learn how to solve a simpler problem and use the acquired knowledge to solve a harder problem in the next step.
Ease of Design:
By restricting the design to a time-free model, one cannot use hardware clocks and hence, clock-based mechanisms like a lease [31] . Leases are a very elegant and useful tool and in the design of our protocols we make intensive use of leases. Leases can often be used to replace crash failure detectors and timing failure detectors. Using crash and timing failure detectors to replace leases is often impossible or at least very awkward.
Another difference between our approach and that of [32] is the use of a feasibility analysis to determine the parameters of the system, e.g.,
. While we do not suggest the use of a feasibility analysis, a feasibility analysis can also be combined with our approach if needed. However, a feasibility analysis might not always be possible since the feasibility conditions of COTS components are often not known. The authors of [32] acknowledge that feasibility conditions cannot guarantee the timeliness (and, hence the safety) of the system. For most systems it seems therefore to be more cost effective to use a measurement based approach (possibly combined with faultinjection) to determine the parameters of the model instead of a feasibility analysis since the safety of the system has to be guaranteed in some other way anyhow. The measurements can be used to select appropriate model parameters to make sure that the system is sufficiently live.
Semantics and Performance

Semantics
The group communication semantics that we consider belong to three classes: and a d
. The termination semantics specifies which updates have to be delivered by processes, the atomicity semantics requires processes to agree on the updates they deliver, and the a d e semantics determines the order in which different updates are delivered. The Timewheel group communication service provides three atomicity semantics -weak atomicity, strong atomicity and strict atomicity-and three order semantics -unordered, total order, and time order. The termination semantics, the three atomicity semantics, and the three order semantics result in nine group communication semantics. A novel feature of the Timewheel group communication service is that users can dynamically choose these semantics when broadcasting an update. In particular, a user may broadcast one update with one pair of atomicity and order semantics, and the next update with another pair.
Group communication systems proposed earlier have provided similar semantics. These include virtual synchrony [8] , causal and atomic broadcasts [9, 39, 3] , extended virtual synchrony [42] , and uniform broadcast [47] . An important contribution of the timewheel group communication system is that it has classified group communication semantics into logical classes. Also, although some of the group communication systems proposed earlier have provided multiple semantics, timewheel group communication system allows users to dynamically choose these semantics when broadcasting an update.
Termination
The termination semantics requires that all updates proposed by (1) is timely, (2) can communicate in a timely manner with a majority of processes in the team, and all these processes are ( -stable, and (3) can detect all messages from non ( -stable processes as being late, and can reject them.
Order
The unordered delivery allows group members to deliver updates in any order. In particular, different group members may deliver updates in different orders. Total order delivery ensures that (1) all group members deliver all updates proposed with total order semantics in the same order, and (2) In defining total and time orders, causal order [8] between updates being broadcast plays an important role. Causal order is defined using the "happened before" relation [36] . An event . Synchronized clocks can be used to guarantee causal delivery in the presence of hidden communication channels. A requirement for this is that the minimum communication delays of hidden communication channels must be greater than the maximum deviation between clocks [36] . The Timewheel group communication service does not explicitly provide a separate causal order semantics. However, the total and time order can be combined with an appropriate atomicity semantics to ensure causal delivery.
Atomicity
Weak atomicity requires that when a group member delivers an update . This means that strong atomicity cannot guarantee causal delivery in the presence of hidden channels.
Strict atomicity satisfies strong atomicity. In addition, it requires that a process deliver an update T only when a majority of processes deliver T . The inconsistent behaviors described for weak atomicity and strong atomicity cannot happen in strict atomicity. This is because, those inconsistent behaviors were possible due to the fact that a single group member (or a minority subset of group members) could deliver an update without knowing if other group members have delivered that update. With strict atomicity, a majority of processes has to deliver any update, and because a group must contain a majority of the processes, all group members have to deliver that update. Since the Timewheel group communication service assumes synchronized clocks, time ordered delivery together with strict atomicity guarantees causal delivery even in the presence of communication through hidden communication channels.
Performance Metrics
We consider the following important performance indices: average broadcast delivery time, average broadcast stability time, average number of messages needed to broadcast an update, throughput, and the distribution of processing load among group members. The broadcast delivery time of an update is defined to be the duration between the moment that update is entrusted to the broadcast service by a group member and the moment that update is delivered by the service to every group member. When messages can get lost, the broadcast servers that implement the distributed broadcast service must store a message that broadcasts an update in a local buffer until they learn that the update is stable, that is, it was received by all group members. The broadcast stability time of an update is the duration between the moment a broadcast server receives that update to be broadcast and the moment all broadcast servers learn that the update is stable. The number of messages needed to broadcast an update includes all messages sent by different group members to complete the broadcast of the update. The throughput is defined as the number of updates delivered per second by each group member for a given update arrival rate. The distribution of processing load among group members refers to how busy a member is in relation to other members, over some sufficiently long period of time (so that all group members initiate about the same number of broadcasts during that period).
Informal Overview
The timewheel group communication system consists of a clock synchronization protocol, an atomic broadcast protocol, and a group membership protocol. It depends on an unreliable datagram protocol such as UDP for communication. Figure 1 shows the dependency relation between these protocols.
The clock synchronization protocol keeps the local clocks of correct processes synchronized: (1) the deviation between two synchronized clocks is bounded by a given constant k , and (2) the drift rate of the synchronized clocks is within a known linear envelope of real time. In the timed asynchronous distributed system model, it is not possible to keep correct clocks synchronized all the time. This is because this model allows a (very unlikely) run in which none of the processes can communicate with any one another. We therefore use a fail-aware clock synchronization protocol [24] that guarantees that (1) any process knows at any time if its clock is synchronized, and (2) whenever the underlying datagram and process service allows this, 's clock is synchronized. A process that cannot keep its clock synchronized is removed from the current group by the group membership protocol. When can synchronize its clock again, applies to join the group again. The timewheel broadcast protocol, described in detail in Section 5, is an optimization and extension of the protocols proposed in [12] and [19] . A broadcast of an update may be initiated by a member at any time by sending a proposal message to all group members. Another type of message called a decision message is used to (1) associate unique numbers called ordinals to updates/membership changes, f (2) establish the stability of broadcast updates, and (3) detect message losses. A group member, called the decider, is responsible for sending decision messages. A decision message includes an ordering and acknowledgement list (referred to as oal henceforth) consisting of update/membership change descriptors, along with information about which group members have received those update/membership changes.
In order to distribute the processing load evenly among all group members and to detect process or communication failures fast, the role of the decider is rotated among group members. All group members are cyclically ordered. A group member d relinquishes its decider role by sending a decision message in at most l time units, and the next group member in the cyclical order assumes the decider role on receiving this decision message. This decision message also is used to maintain the liveliness of the group communication service during idle periods. Each member maintains two buffers-a proposal buffer, to store the received proposals, and a proposal descriptor buffer, to store proposal descriptors and their ordinals. Both of these buffers are updated on receipt of proposal or decision messages. Updates stored in these buffers are delivered to the clients when three delivery conditions, atomicity, order, and general, are satisfied.
The timewheel group membership protocol, described in detail in Section 6, is a majority agreement protocol [15] . It maintains a consistent, system-wide, current group (sometimes also called "view") of processes that exhibit "synchronous behavior". The meaning of synchronous behavior is formalized by the predicate ( -stable [24] defined in Section 3. The membership protocol tries to provide each process with an up-to-date group of processes that currently exhibit synchronous behavior. Because processes can be partitioned, it is not always possible that all processes maintain an up-to-date group. The timewheel membership protocol is fail-aware in the sense that a process knows at any point in time if its current group is up-to-date.
The group membership problem or the atomic broadcast problem is not solvable in a time-free asynchronous system model [30, 11] . However, existing asynchronous systems have typically enough "synchronism" to allow a deterministic solution of the group membership or the atomic broadcast problem. For example, a typical execution of a system consists of long periods in which the system is ( -stable interleaved by relatively short periods in which the system is not ( -stable. We formalize this observation by a progress assumption [23] : we assume that the system will be infinitely often ( -stable. This progress assumption allows a deterministic m The delivery order of updates/membership changes is not necessarily the same as the order of the ordinals associated with them. solution of consensus [23] . Since the consensus problem is as hard as the group membership or the atomic broadcast problem [11] , it also allows a deterministic solution of the group membership or the atomic broadcast problem. ; it is used to minimize stability times.
A positive acknowledgement scheme is used to recover from communication failures and establish the stability of updates. A decider assigns ordinals and explicitly acknowledges proposals by sending a decision message.
Other processes implicitly acknowledge the receipt of a proposal with ordinal when they send a proposal with r $ a greater than or equal to . To bound the stability time, a process must acknowledge all received proposals periodically. To facilitate this and to distribute evenly the communication overhead of sending decision messages among group members, the role of the decider is rotated between group members along a logical ring that defines a predecessor/successor relation among group members. A member becomes a decider after it receives a decision message from its predecessor in the logical ring, and relinquishes its decider role by sending a decision message. The duration for which a member can be a decider is bounded by an a priori given constant An update proposed by a group member should be admitted to be delivered only if the sender has been a member of all groups formed since it proposed that update. For example, let process 
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. In the following, the current group refers to the last group described in e " V T is erasable by the deletion rules, or (2) T is marked as undeliverable by the membership protocol, i.e., the sender of . Finally, the atomicity condition for updates sent with weak atomicity is always true.
Delivery of Updates
The order condition for updates with unordered delivery semantics is always true. The order condition for an update T with total order delivery is satisfied at when has delivered all updates with unordered/total order semantics that have ordinals smaller than that of 
Stability and Flow Control
Since proposal descriptors of all ordered but unstable proposals are included in a decision message, establishing a fast update stability is very important to reduce the size of a decision message. The Timewheel broadcast protocol employs several techniques to ensure a faster update stability. We already described the use of the decision messages and the inclusion of the r $ a in a proposal message to reduce the stability time.
However, in a situation where one or more group members do not send any proposals and other group members send proposals at a fast rate, the decision message size may become large. To address such situations, the Timewheel broadcast protocol employs another technique. A group member sends a delivery update message that includes its r $ a to all group members, if (i) the number of proposal descriptors in the latest decision message received is greater than mtr (maximum threshold), (ii) the difference between the highest ordinal in the latest decision message and the r $ a reported last is greater than mlg (maximum lag), and (iii) if the maximum time until will be the the decider is greater than time units. This ensures that silent group members send their r $ a if the decision message size is becoming large. This in turn ensures a faster update stability when some group members are sending proposals at a very slow rate while others are sending at a very fast rate.
In addition to ensuring small decision message sizes, update stability is also used in purging proposal buffers and proposal descriptor buffers. After an update . Despite these rules for purging buffers, it is possible that these buffers overflow. This is more likely to happen when updates arrive at a very fast rate or when communication failures occur often [40] . The purpose of flow control is to handle such situations. The flow control therefore piggy-backs on every decision message the highest continuously delivered ordinal, 
Timewheel Group Membership
The timewheel membership protocol is a majority agreement protocol [15] : (1) it provides a sequence of completed majority groups, where a completed majority group is a majority group joined by all its members, and (2) all members of a completed majority group @ in this sequence agree on a history of replica updates when they join @ . A consequence of the majority agreement membership protocol is that there may be some limited divergences between the histories seen by the members of completed majority groups and other team members [15] .
More precisely, the membership protocol satisfies the following properties (see [26] (   -stable for at least time units, it is included in any up-to-date group, (4) if a process' current group has been out-of-date for time units, it is excluded from all up-to-date groups, and (5) an up-to-date group contains at least a majority of the processes.
Overview
This protocol is based on the ideas developed in the membership protocols described in [3, 39, 4] . Informally, the key idea in these protocols is that the team members exchange membership messages and each live team member maintains a set $ of live team members based on these messages. The team members continue to exchange membership messages until the following property is satisfied:
We conceptionally split the timewheel membership protocol into two parts at each team member-a failure detector and a group creator. Each failure detector maintains an alive-list of team members that are currently functioning correctly. A failure detector is unreliable, i.e., an alive-list can contain team members that have failed, or there might exist some team members that are live but not in the alive-list. Furthermore, the alive-lists maintained by different failure detectors can be different. A group creator uses this alive-list to maintain a grouplist. It guarantees that all correct team members in a group-list agree on the current and past group-lists. We call a process in a group-list a group member.
While the timewheel membership protocol deals with all failure scenarios that may occur within the failure model assumed, it is optimized for those scenarios that are more likely to occur than others. This protocol does not send any messages as long as all group members periodically send their decision messages. When the role of the decider is lost, because of a single process crash or an omission/performance failure of a single decision message, a simple and fast single-failure election protocol is started to instantiate a new decider. When the less likely case of multiple failures occurs, a multiple-failure election protocol is started to create a new group.
This protocol uses three control messages: no-decision, join, and reconfiguration. In addition, a decision message, which is a part of the timewheel atomic broadcast protocol, is also treated as a control message by the membership protocol. A failure detector keeps all group members under surveillance by checking that they send control messages periodically. Recall that group members take turns to take the role of decider in the timewheel atomic broadcast protocol, and a decider sends a decision message in at most l time units after it takes the decider role. So, a failure detector expects to receive a decision message after at most A failure detector suspects that a group member has failed, if it doesn't receive a control message from in the expected interval of time. In such a case, it informs the group creator that a member has crashed. The group creator then uses a single-failure or a multiple-failure election protocol to instantiate a new decider and to exclude the failed process(es) from the membership. After the role of the decider is lost, the remaining group members first try to elect a new decider using the single-failure election protocol. In case this mechanism fails to elect a new decider-possible when multiple failures occur-a second election mechanism is applied, which is based on sending of reconfiguration messages periodically. The election algorithm has to ensure that at most one decider is created. This is complicated by the fact that when a process participates in the election of a new decider, further failures can force processes to start a new election, and this could lead to the instantiation of multiple deciders. We solve this problem by using synchronized clocks in a simple way: a process can only participate in one election per cycle and messages sent to elect a new decider can only be used for about (u -1)l time units after they were sent and by at most one process. To understand this, suppose process participates in an election and this leads to the instantiation of a new decider and, suppose later on participates in a new election. Since, will no longer assume the role of decider in the group resulted from the earlier election, it will take at most u slot times (one cycle) for the role of decider to be lost in this earlier group. Hence, if waits until its next time slot (one cycle) before it participates in a new election, there can be at most one decider at any time.
The initial group, i.e., the first group created after the system starts, is formed in the following way. When a process is created or recovers after a crash, it sends a 8 message in each of its time-slots. It continues to update its alive-list based on which processes have sent join messages. When a majority of the processes have sent join messages with the same alive-list, a new decider is instantiated. l is the maximum time interval after which a decider sends a decision message, and is the one-way timeout delay described in Section 2.
Detailed Description
In the following discussion, we say that a timeout failure has occurred, when a failure detector reports a failure suspicion. We assume that processes reject duplicate or old control messages, i.e., when we say that a process receives a control message from the expected sender
9
, we implicitly assume that checks the send timestamp of to determine that it hadn't already received , and that is sent after time © v 9 .
Group Creator
It is the responsibility of the group creator to instantiate a new decider when the role of the decider is lost. The group creator ensures that all created groups include at least a majority of the processes and all members have the same group-list. This is done by allowing only the decider to change the group-lists. The decider disseminates these changes by appending a membership descriptor containing the new group-list to the ordering and acknowledge list in its decision message. Group creators of other members use this descriptor to update their group-lists. We describe a group creator as a finite state machine with six states (see Figure 2) : join, failure-free, wrong-suspicion, 1-failure-receive, 1-failure-send, and n-failure. The join state handles the creation of a new group. This new group consists of the members of the current group and processes which want to be integrated into the group. During stable periods, when there are no communication or process failures, all group members are in failure-free state. They all become decider periodically, and send at least one decision message per cycle. The 1-failure-receive, 1-failure-send, and the wrong-suspicion states are used to handle a single omission/performance failure of a decision messages (which may cause the loss of decider) or a single crash/performance failure of a current group member. A process enters a 1-failure-receive or 1-failure-send state, if it concurs with a single failure suspicion. A process enters a wrong-suspicion state, if it does not concur with a single failure suspicion. This wrong-suspicion state is introduced to mask situations in which some processes do not receive a decision message from the current decider d in time and try to exclude d from the membership. Finally, the n-failure state is used to handle more than one failure during a cycle.
Join State
All team members are in join state at the start of the system. In addition, a team member is in join state after it recovers from a crash failure. The membership protocol creates the first group as follows. Each process in join state maintains a list, join-list , of all those processes from which has received at least one join message in the last u -1 slots; join-list always contains itself. A process includes its join-list in each join message it sends. A process 5 becomes the decider in its time slot, when (1) join-list contains a majority of the processes, and (2) 5 has received a join message from each process in join-list in the 's last time slot, such that join-list = join-list . Process creates a new group containing exactly the processes in its join-list, transits to a failure-free state, and sends a decision message (the first decision message). This decision message includes a membership descriptor containing the membership of the new group. This algorithm guarantees that more than one deciders cannot be elected at the same time. This is because a new decider is elected as soon as a majority of the processes agrees on the join-list. In case, another process does not receive the first decision message from the newly elected decider 
Failure-free State
If is in failure-free state and a timeout failure of the expected decider is in failure-free state and receives a reconfiguration message from the expected decider, it switches to n-failure state, indicating that at least two failures have occurred.
Wrong-suspicion State
A process is in wrong-suspicion state when a single failure has been suspected and does not concur with this suspicion. In this state, checks which process is suspected to have failed. If itself is suspected, it resends its last control message after the receipt of each no-decision message. This ensures that if 's last control message was lost because of a transient communication failure, other group members are expected to receive this retransmitted control message before they decide to exclude from the membership. However, notice that in our system model, there is no guarantee that this retransmitted control message will be received by other group members. Indeed, in a timed asynchronous system, we cannot guarantee that a live group member will not be excluded from the membership.
In a wrong-suspicion state, a process expects to receive a no-decision message or a decision message at least once in every l time units from the expected senders. In this state, if a timeout failure of the expected sender occurs, or if receives a reconfiguration message from the expected sender, it transits to n-failure state indicating that multiple failures have occurred. If in wrong-suspicion state receives a no-decision message from its predecessor, it assumes the role of the decider and switches to failure-free state. In the failure-free state, will create a decision message using the information it has received from 5 ' s last decision message, where 5 is the suspected process, and send this decision message as usual. If in wrong-suspicion state receives a decision message from the expected sender and it is still a member of the current group, it transits to failure-free state. This situation occurs when another group member that does not concur with the failure suspicion has sent a decision message. If, on the other hand, receives a decision message from the expected sender, and it is no longer a member of the current group, i.e., a new group has been formed that does not contain as a member, switches to join state. 
1-failure-receive State
1-failure-send State
A process in 1-failure-send state has already sent a no-decision message indicating that it suspects the failure of a member is not included in the new group, it waits until it has received a decision message from all new group members. After receiving decision messages from all new group members 5 switches to join state. This delayed switch to the join state ensures that when the role of the decider is lost in less than a decider round, could participate in a new election. In our failure assumptions, we assumed that at least a majority of processes ª which were members of the last group survive until a new process is reintegrated into the system. This ensures that the a new decider is elected as soon as all processes in ª can communicate in a timely manner.
Notice that in the protocol described so far, a no-decision message followed by a reconfiguration message sent by the same process could result in multiple deciders. This is because both the single-failure and multiple failure elections could be successful in this case. To avoid this situation, when switches to n-failure state, it does not participate in a new election for the duration of u -1 slot times. If the first election is successful and becomes the decider, it transits to failure-free state. If the single-failure election is successful, but does not assume the role of the decider, the decider role created by the single-failure election will lost in at most (u -1)l time units. During this waiting period, transmits a reconfiguration message with an empty reconfiguration-list in its time slot. This ensures that will not participate in an election for at least u -1 slots and that a new decider is typically elected in two rounds.
Preserving Order and Atomicity Semantics
Whenever a change in the group membership occurs due to process departures, some of the updates proposed by the departed group member(s) may have to be discarded. This is needed to ensure various ordering and atomicity semantics that the timewheel group communication service provides. Hence some proposal descriptors have to be removed from the e V
. The key problem is to ensure that all current group members deliver an update whose proposal descriptor is not removed from e V , and no current group member deliver an update whose proposal descriptor is removed from e " V .
Undeliverable Proposals
We call a proposal that should not be delivered by any of the current group members an undeliverable proposal. The rationale behind lost proposals is that no current group member has received & , and so the update proposed in & cannot be delivered. The rationale behind orphan-order proposal is that both the total and the time order delivery semantics must preserve the FIFO property, i.e the updates proposed by the same process must be delivered in the order they are proposed. If j is an orphan-order proposal, the update proposed in 8 &
is not delivered and so, the update proposed later by the same sender in & should also be not delivered. The rationale behind orphan-atomicity proposal is that strong and strict atomicity require that the update proposed in & Finally, the rationale behind unknown dependency proposal is that while & has been received by some or all group members, no member knows some of the proposals on which j could depend. This situation can occur as follows. Process 
Removal of Undeliverable Proposals
The proposal descriptors of all undeliverable proposals must be removed from the " V and all such proposals must be purged from current group members' local buffers. To remove such proposals from " V and are received after has sent the no-decision or reconfiguration message.A process does not deliver or acknowledge any proposal that is marked as undeliverable. An undeliverable mark on a proposal is automatically cleared after one cycle, unless it was set again. This is because a no-decision or reconfiguration message can only be used for the creation of a new group for at most the duration of u p z Q slots.
Let us assume that a new group is created by a process by removing process to indicate that no group member will deliver the corresponding update. Furthermore, proposals which have already been delivered by some members, but which haven't been ordered so far, are appended to the e " V by using field d e j d
of the reconfiguration or no-decision messages received from all new group members. The proposal descriptors marked as undeliverable are deleted from e V by a decider when these descriptors reach the head of e V
. In addition, each group member purges all proposals marked as undeliverable from their j d
and A
.
Implementation
The timewheel group communication system has been implemented in three different forms. The first implementation runs on a network of SGI workstations (Indys and O2s) connected by a moderately loaded 10Mb/s Ethernet. The second implementation runs on a network of Windows/NT workstations. The third implementation uses CORBA [1] and runs on a network of SGI (Indys and O2s), Windows/NT, and Sun workstations. In this section, we will focus on the implementation details of the first implementation that runs on a network of SGI workstations. This implementation uses the UDP broadcast socket interface of the Unix operating system.
Despite our experience in implementing several group communication protocols [39, 17, 19] , implementation of the timewheel group communication system was nontrivial. There were two main complexities we encountered while implementing this protocol. First, unlike other group communication systems, the timewheel group communication system provides multiple semantics concurrently. This complicates the management of temporary buffers used to store broadcast and membership updates. Second, unlike in other group communication protocols proposed for an asynchronous distributed system, the number of events that may occur concurrently at a group member is rather large in the timewheel group communication system. One specific goal in designing the timewheel group communication system is to provide good overall performance under several different operating conditions. With multiple semantics and the possibility of several concurrent events, this is difficult. We now describe some specific implementation details that address each of these complexities.
Delivery Mechanism
An update is delivered at a group member after its general, atomicity, and order conditions are satisfied. On receiving a decision or a proposal message, a group member needs to check these delivery conditions for all undelivered updates stored in its temporary buffer. This may take large amount of time, particularly if the number of undelivered updates is large. This problem does not occur in other previously proposed group communication services, because they provide only one group communication semantics. In these services, the ordinals assigned to the broadcast updates provide an order in which a group member can check the delivery conditions of undelivered updates: if an update with ordinal is not deliverable, all updates with ordinals larger than will also be
®
We hereby ignore the purging of stable descriptors and different values in the acknowledgment fields.
not deliverable. This makes it easy to check efficiently for delivery conditions in these services: a group member can stop checking for the delivery conditions of the undelivered updates as soon as it encounters an update that is not deliverable. In other words, a group member checks the delivery condition of at most one undeliverable update at any time when updates become deliverable.
Unfortunately, due to a large number of semantics, such simple implementation techniques can not be used in the timewheel group communication system. Updates in the timewheel service do not necessarily become deliverable in the order of the ordinals assigned to them. In particular, it is possible that an update with ordinal is not deliverable, and an update with an ordinal larger than is deliverable. In fact, an update may be deliverable at a group member, even before that group member knows the ordinal of that update. The delivery mechanism is further complicated by the fact that delivery conditions depend on what updates have been delivered so far. So, it is possible that after delivering an update, another update that was not deliverable before may become deliverable.
To ensure good performance, we need a mechanism that a group member can use to deliver all deliverable updates with minimal processing. In other words, this mechanism should minimize the number of undeliverable updates checked for delivery. One implementation could be to maintain nine separate queues of undelivered updates, with each queue storing updates with a different pair of order and atomicity semantics. Updates in these queues are stored in an order in which they may be delivered. For example, updates in a queue for total order and strong atomicity semantics can be stored in the order of the ordinals assigned to these updates. This is because an update with this pair of semantics can become deliverable only after all updates with lower ordinals have been delivered. So, once a group member finds an undeliverable update in this queue, it doesn't need to check the delivery conditions of any updates stored later in the queue.
There are two main problems with this mechanism. One is that maintaining nine different queues has significant performance overhead. A group member needs to check all these queues on receiving a proposal or a decision message. The second problem is that a group member may have to switch between queues while checking for the delivery conditions of different updates. For example, updates broadcast with total order semantics must be delivered in the order of their ordinals. But, depending on their atomicity semantics, these updates may belong to three different queues, and a group member has to switch among these three queues to check the delivery conditions of these updates.
This mechanism can be simplified by maintaining only three queues: one for updates broadcast with unordered semantics, second for updates broadcast with total order semantics, and third for updates broadcast with time order semantics. Updates in the queue for total order semantics are stored in the order of their ordinals. Updates in the queue for time order semantics are stored in the order of their send timestamps. There is no need for any specific ordering in the queue storing updates with unordered semantics. When a group member receives a proposal or a decision message, it first updates all its buffers and queues appropriately, and then checks the delivery conditions of the updates in the unordered queue. It delivers all updates that are deliverable in this queue, and then checks for the delivery conditions of the updates in the total order queue. It continues to deliver updates from this queue until it finds an update that is not deliverable. At this point, it starts checking for the delivery conditions of the updates in the time order queue. It continues to deliver updates from this queue until it finds an update that is not deliverable. This terminates the delivery mechanism.
In this mechanism, a group member has to check the delivery conditions of at most one undeliverable update in the total order queue and at most one undeliverable update in the time order queue. However, it has to check the delivery conditions of all updates in the unordered queue. Since, the delivery conditions of unordered updates is satisfied fast, the size of the queue storing unordered updates is expected to be small, thus resulting in minimal performance overhead.
Handling Concurrent Events
There are at least five types of events that may occur concurrently at a group member in the timewheel broadcast service. These are: a broadcast request received from a client, a proposal or a decision message received from the communication network, a timeout event for sending a decision message, a timeout event for receiving a decision message, and a failure notification event. One way to handle these concurrent events is to use a thread package. In a typical thread-based implementation, one thread per event type is used. We used threads to handle concurrent events in the past in implementing several group communication protocols [39, 19] . While using threads provides a natural way to handle concurrent events, an initial attempt in using threads to implement the timewheel broadcast service indicated that there is a significant performance overhead. This significant performance overhead results from having to use a large number of threads and to schedule these threads explicitly. Since the number of different types of concurrent events in the timewheel broadcast service is large, a large number of threads needs to be created and maintained. As a result, the performance overhead associated with creating and maintaining this large number of threads is large. Furthermore, to avoid dealing with race conditions among these threads, we schedule these threads explicitly in the protocol code. Due to a large number of threads, this takes up significant amount of time.
For these reasons, we chose an event-based implementation of the timewheel broadcast service. To do so, we first implemented an event handler that allows a client to wait for multiple concurrent events: the client can define for each event a procedure that processes that event. As soon as an event occurs, the event handler calls the appropriate procedure to allow the client to process that event. At any time, at most one event is processed and therefore no explicit synchronization between procedures that are processing the events is necessary. The event handler is implemented by one thread and allows an efficient processing of a large number of different types of events. A detailed comparison between a thread-based implementation and an event-based implementation to handle concurrent events in group communication services is given in [41] .
Performance
We have done a detailed performance evaluation of the timewheel group communication system. In this section, we report the performance measured from the implementation of this system on a network of SGI workstations (Indys) connected by a 10Mb/s Ethernet. This implementation consists of about 2,000 lines of C++ code and uses the event-based implementation mechanism to handle concurrent events. We have reported absolute performance in this section. A comparative performance with other group communication services will be perhaps more useful, but we could not find an implementation of other group communication service on similar computing platform.
Atomic Broadcast
We measured four performance indices: throughput, average delivery time, average stability time, and average number of messages needed per update broadcast. Because the timewheel group communication system provides several different group communication semantics, we describe its performance for different group communication semantics separately.
Throughput
The throughput measurements reported here are from a set of nine experiments that correspond to nine group communication semantics. In all these experiments, the group size was three and all group members broadcast updates at a uniform rate varying from 50 to 2000 updates per second. The throughput measured from these experiments are shown in Figures 3, 4 , and 5. Figure 3 shows the throughput for updates broadcast with weak atomicity and no order semantics, weak atomicity and total order semantics, and weak atomicity and time order semantics. The number of updates delivered per second is approximately equal to the total number of requests generated per second for up to about 500 requests generated per second. Note that the flow control mechanism allows the timewheel system to refuse new proposal to avoid buffer overflows. As the request generation rate increases past 500 updates per second, the effect of processing and queuing delays cause the number of updates delivered per second to be smaller than the number of requests generated per second. The maximum number of updates that our implementation could deliver per second was about 1850 for weak atomicity and no order semantics, 1800 for weak atomicity and total order semantics, and 1700 for weak atomicity and time order semantics. Beyond these update arrival rates, the UDP message loss rate becomes significant due to the saturation of the Ethernet driver and is the dominant reason why throughput stops increasing.
In a similar fashion, Figure 4 and 5 show the throughput for updates broadcast with strong atomicity and strict atomicity semantics respectively, with each of the three order semantics. The variation of the throughput with update arrival rate and order semantics is similar to that observed for weak atomicity semantics.
Comparing the three figures ( Figures 3, 4 and 5) , it is clear that the throughput decreases as the semantics range from no order to time order and from weak atomicity to strict atomicity. The throughput is highest for weak atomicity and no order semantics, and lowest for strict atomicity and time order semantics. This is an expected result as the weak atomicity and no order are the weakest atomicity and order semantics respectively, and the strict atomicity and time order are the strongest semantics respectively. We measured average delivery times for four different update interarrival times. Table 1 shows the average delivery times measured for (weak atomicity, total order), (strong atomicity, time order), (strict atomicity, no order), and (strict atomicity, total order) semantics. For all semantics, the delivery time is higher at low update interarrival times. It levels off with increase in the update interarrival time. The reason for large delivery times at low update interarrival times is that an update may arrive at a group member before that member has finished processing one or more updates arrived earlier. As a result, an update may have to wait for some time at a group member for processing at low update interarrival times. Average delivery time also depends on the group communication semantics used to broadcast an update. Similar to the observation in throughput measurement, the average delivery time increases as the group communication semantics vary from no order to time order and from weak atomicity to strict atomicity. Again, this is an expected result. 
Delivery Time
Semantics
Stability Time
We measured average stability times for four different update interarrival times. Table 2 shows the average stability times measured for (weak atomicity, no order), (weak atomicity, total order), (strong atomicity, time order), and (strict atomicity, no order) semantics. Once again, we notice that the stability time is higher at low update interarrival times and it levels off with increase in the interarrival time. A similar pattern was observed in the average delivery time and the reason for this is same as that given for the average delivery time. Also the variation in average stability time with group communication semantics is similar to that in average delivery time. This is again an expected result. 
Semantics
Number of Messages
The average number of messages exchanged per atomic broadcast is shown in Table 3 
Group Membership
We evaluated the timewheel group membership protocol in two ways. First, we measured the effect of the membership protocol on the performance of the timewheel group communication system when there are no failures. Second, we measured the time it takes for a new group to be formed after a member failure.
To measure the effect of the membership protocol on the performance of the timewheel group communication system when there are no failures, we measured all the performance indices reported in Section 8.1 under two different system setups. In the first setup, the group communication system consisted of only the timewheel atomic broadcast protocol and the clock synchronization protocol. In the second setup, the group communication system consisted of the timewheel atomic broadcast protocol, clock synchronization protocol, and the timewheel group membership protocol. Our measurements showed that there was no significant difference between the performance measured from the two setups. This indicates that the group membership protocol has no significant performance overhead when there are no failures.
The time to create a group after a member failure depends on three factors: team size, decider timeout period (l ), and number of simultaneous failures. Table 4 shows the average time it takes to create a group after a single failure, two-process failure, and three-process failure for various values of team size and decider timeout period.
To simulate the failure of a process, we simply killed that process. The time create a group after a failure depends on precisely when a process is killed during a time slot. We had no way of controlling this precise time in our experiments. As a result, the time to create a group that we measured varied significantly (by 2 -3 milliseconds) over different runs. The average time reported in Table 4 There are three observations we make from these measurements. First, there is a significant difference in the time to create a group between a single process failure case and a multiple process failure case. The reason for this is that the membership protocol has been optimized for a single failure case, which occurs most commonly. We have used a fast protocol to construct a group after a single failure. The main delay in this case is the time it takes for the first process to detect the failure. This time is set to twice the decider timeout delay (2*l ). As a result, the time to create a new group in this case is little more than 2*l .
In case of multiple simultaneous failures, the n-failure protocol is initiated only after a process detects a second failure. This may take up to four times the decision timeout period. As a result, the time to create a new group is little more than 4*l . It is important to note that the difference in time to create a new group between two simultaneous failures and more than two simultaneous failures is not expected to be much. This is evident from the three simultaneous failure experiment that we performed. The reason for this is that the n-failure protocol is initiated as soon as a second failure is detected, irrespective of the total number of simultaneous failures.
Second, the decision timeout period is the dominant factor in determining the time to create a new group after one or more failures. The other factor that affects this time is the communication delay between processes. Typically communication delay is an order of magnitude smaller than the decision timeout period. Finally, increase in team size increases (slightly) the time to create a group. The reason for this is that with increase in team size, more processes need to agree on the new group membership. This requires more message exchanges and results in a increased time to create a new group.
Applications
The best way to determine the utility of a system-level service, such as a group communication service, is by demonstrating its use in the construction of various applications. While several group communication services have been proposed in literature so far, efforts in actually constructing dependable distributed applications using these services have been minimal. At present, we have used the timewheel group communication service to construct two dependable distributed applications: an availability management service [38] and a stable storage service [20] . Both of these applications vary in their semantic requirements and demonstrate the usefulness of multiple group communication semantics provided by the timewheel group communication service. We briefly describe these applications here.
Availability Management Service
We have designed and implemented an automatic availability management service called Teams [38] that uses the timewheel group communication service. Teams automatically reconfigures a distributed system in the presence of communication and node failures in such a way that all computing services remain available, and the system reconfiguration is transparent to the users. Teams provides automatic availability properties to the computing services that use either the primary-backup model or the active replication model for replication. Teams provides excellent performance and can reconfigure the system in response node failures, communication partitions, or maintenance operations in less than 8 milliseconds.
The excellent performance of Teams has been made possible by the multiple group communication semantics provided by the timewheel group communication service. Teams servers broadcast four different operations using the timewheel group communication service. To broadcast these operations, these servers use the weakest possible semantics that is sufficient to ensure correctness. In particular, (total order, weak atomicity) and (total order, strong atomicity) semantics have been used to broadcast various operations. These semantics are sufficient to ensure the correctness of Teams functionalities (See [38] for details). By choosing the weakest possible semantics, the performance of Teams has been maximized.
Stable Storage Service
We have designed and implemented a stable-storage service [20] that runs on various Unix operating systems including Solaris, IRIX, and Ultrix. This service allows servers to create, access, and delete persistent memory that survives server and disk crashes. In particular, this service allows users to create and access two types of persistent memory: checkpoint and log memory. Checkpoint memory is of fixed size, while log memory is a dynamically growing sequences of fixed-size log entries.
In order to tolerate disk failures, this stable storage service uses the timewheel group communication service to replicate the stable-storage data over multiple disks. In this implementation, each disk is managed by a separate stable-storage server and the set of all servers managing the stable-storage data form a group. The timewheel group communication service has been used to reliably and atomically disseminate stable-storage service updates to all group members, and to manage server failures and recoveries in a consistent manner. This implementation uses (unordered, weak atomicity) semantics of the timewheel group communication service to disseminate the stable storage service updates to all group members. Once again, with the availability of multiple group communication semantics, we were able to use the weakest possible semantics that is sufficient for the correctness of the stable storage service. This has resulted in improving the performance of the stable storage service.
Discussion
Group communication services have proved to be extremely useful for constructing highly available and dependable distributed applications. Because of their usefulness, a large number of group communication services have been proposed, designed, and implemented. Notable ones include Isis [8, 9] , Mars [35, 34] , Delta-4 [44] , AAS [6, 16] , Transis [3] , Consul [39] , Totem [4] , Horus [50] , Pinwheel [19] , Spread [5, 2] , and Bimodal [7] . Most of these services have been implemented for an asynchronous distributed computing environment, and do not provide any timeliness guarantees. Specification of these services state the outputs and state transitions that should occur in response to particular inputs, but they do not state any real-time interval with in which these outputs and state transitions will occur. As a result, these services cannot be used for constructing real-time, dependable, distributed applications. This is a major limitation of these services.
On the other hand, group communication services that provide timeliness guarantees [34, 16] are designed for a synchronous distributed system. The key limitation of these services is that they cannot be used on most commonly available distributed computing environment that are typically asynchronous in nature. Synchronous distributed computing environment require special-purpose hardware and software components, and are typically quite expensive when compared to asynchronous distributed systems. So, on one hand, we have group communication services that can operate on commonly available distributed computing environment that are asynchronous in nature, but they cannot be used to construct realt-ime, dependable distributed applications. On the other hand, we have group communication services that can be used to construct real-time, dependable distributed applications, but they cannot operate on asynchronous distributed computing environment.
The timewheel group communication service proposed in this paper address this limitation of group communication services. It operates in a (timed) asynchronous distributed computing environment, and provides timeliness guarantees that can be used to construct dependable, distributed applications that have timeliness requirements. The key characteristic of this service is that the protocols that comprise this service are fail aware. This means that a process can determine if it is satisfying the specified timeliness properties at any time. In case it determines that it cannot satisfy those properties, perhaps due to excessive performance failures, it can inform the application about this situation.
This fail-awareness property is made possible by the fact that the commonly available distributed computing environments have been modeled as timed asynchronous distributed computing environment. These computing environments were traditionally modeled as asynchronous distributed computing environment that had not timeliness specifications. The timed asynchronous distributed computing model recognizes that fact that although in most distributed computing systems, communication delays or process scheduling delays are unbounded, they are likely to be less than some time bound most of the time. This observation allows us to build fail-aware applications with timeliness guarantees. Details of the timed asynchronous distributed system model are given in [18] , and details of the fail-awareness property are given in [25] .
In addition to the timeliness and fail-awareness properties, the timewheel group communication service provides support for nine group communication semantics simultaneously, preserves causal order between updates that may arise due to hidden communication channels, and provides excellent overall performance that includes fast delivery and stability times, small number of message exchanges per update broadcast, even distribution of processing load among group members, and high throughput.
Research in the design and implementation of group communication services is still going on. Recent focus has been on their deployment in a wide-area networking environment [33, 2] , scalability in terms group size [45, 7, 49] , and their operation in a heterogeneous, distributed computing environment [22, 37] . Timeliness of group communication services in a non-synchronous, distributed computing environment has not been addressed much. This has been a major limitation of group communication services. The timewheel group communication service proposed in this paper is a first step towards addressing this limitation. It is expected that future research will result in further developments in the area of constructing dependable distributed applications with timeliness requirements in a non-synchronous distributed computing environment.
